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The Functioning of the International Oil 
Markets and its Security Implications 
CEPS Working Document No. 351/ May 2011 
Giacomo Luciani 
Introduction 
Energy security is primarily a function of investment. If investment in new capacity, logistics 
and transmission, and preparedness for emergencies is timely and adequate, energy security 
will be guaranteed. 
Investment in a market economy is a function of the expected revenue stream, which in turn 
is a function of prices. Reliable and predictable price signals are a prerequisite of adequate 
investment. If prices are very volatile and/or unpredictable, enterprises will not be confident 
enough to invest. Energy security will be imperilled. 
A well-functioning market is therefore a key component of security. Ideally the market 
should generate stable and predictable prices, i.e. prices that can be modelled on the basis of 
structural factors within a price band which is narrow enough to allow enterprises to have a 
reasonably good idea of the revenue stream that their investment might generate. 
The main obstacle to oil and gas security of supply is the growing volatility of prices and 
their fundamental unpredictability. This leaves enterprises exposed to very high risk and 
will discourage some of them. In these circumstances, it is to be expected that enterprises will 
tend to be conservative and underinvest. 
Security itself is also dependent on prices. Customers feel secure if they can buy all the 
energy they need at prices that they can afford. A purely physical concept of security 
(meaning availability of the quantities of energy that are in demand at any given moment) 
has little meaning because demand varies with price. There always is a price at which 
demand will match supply – it may be a very high price, however, at which some final 
customers may not be able to satisfy their ‘essential needs’ Oil, specifically, has a global 
market and any supply interruption that one can think of is quickly translated into higher 
prices, this being the key mechanism for rationing demand and redistributing supplies 
among different bidders. In the end, oil is almost never physically unavailable. 
But even 'essential needs' are a function of prices, in the sense that in the long run customers 
will adjust their consumption habits to the expected cost of energy and their disposable 
income. In the short term, such adjustments may be difficult, and what creates insecurity is 
the experience of price volatility, the fact of being surprised by sudden changes in price – 
especially, of course, sudden price increases – which were not and could not be expected. 
Hence energy security is as much a matter of perception as one of objective availability. 
Consumers make decisions on the basis of the historically prevailing level of prices: energy 
may be expensive or cheap – in the sense of absorbing a large or small share of their 
spending – and their lifestyles will adjust accordingly. Lifestyles and per capita energy 
consumption in Europe and Japan are quite different from those prevailing in North 
America because for decades energy has been relatively expensive in the former, and 
considerably cheaper in the latter. Nevertheless, consumers in Europe and Japan are not 2 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
insecure because they had to devote a larger share of their income to energy than their North 
American counterparts – their level of consumption has adjusted to the price environment. 
Well-functioning oil and gas markets therefore are not only a prerequisite of energy security 
through their influence on investment and future availability; they are also a component of 
security because volatile and unpredictable prices are part of the definition of insecurity. 
This paper looks at the evolution of prevailing international oil price regimes over the past 
decades and at past attempts at stabilising prices (and reasons why these failed). This 
historical background helps us understand the causes of today’s growing volatility and 
potential remedies for it. The current reference-pricing regime will then be introduced, and 
the debate on the causes of increasing volatility and whether the market responds to 
fundamentals or is dominated by speculators will be summarised. This debate is very much 
underway. 
Next, we shall discuss the structural causes of volatility in the oil and gas markets. It is 
normally accepted that, even if the current market is reformed, volatility can be contained 
but not eliminated. What institutional arrangements can we envisage that will create enough 
long-term convergence in prices to ensure that investment is sufficient to meet future 
demand? 
In the concluding section, I discuss how this relates to other aspects of the analysis of oil 
security, notably the geopolitical aspects and policies for strategic storage and cooperation 
with the exporting countries. 
1.  A short history of oil price regimes 
The figure below is a well known and widely quoted representation of oil prices in nominal 
and real terms since the inception of the oil industry. The figure shows that oil prices were 
extremely volatile in the early days of the industry because output increased suddenly 
whenever there was a new discovery, then declined rapidly as fields were uncontrolled due 
to the law of capture in the US and poor technological understanding of petroleum geology. 
The industry experienced one long stretch of stable oil prices, from the early 1920s to the 
early 1970s: a 50-year period of progressive expansion with slowly declining prices which 
was made possible by very large discoveries in the Middle East coupled with oligopolistic 
control on supplies by the so-called ‘seven (or eight) sisters’, the major international oil 
companies of the time. This control – albeit slowly yet systematically eroded by ‘oil 
independents’ and other newcomers – succeeded in guaranteeing the ’orderly’ development 
of capacity in line with the rapid growth of demand. Oil supply security was guaranteed by 
the seven sisters, although not necessarily at the lowest possible price to the final consumer, 
nor with the fairest possible distribution of financial benefits between the various parties 
involved. 
The seven sisters lost control of the oil market between 1969 and 1973. In 1969, Muammar 
Qaddafi seized power in Libya in a bloodless coup, overturning the Sanusi monarchy. Very 
soon, he started putting pressure on the companies by imposing unilateral production cuts. 
Some of the companies present in Libya had no significant assets elsewhere in the world and 
conceded to Libyan requests. Qaddafi found that it had become possible to play companies 
off against each other. This demonstrated that the bargaining power had shifted from 
companies to producing countries and led to the so-called ‘Tehran-Tripoli agreements’, then 
progressively to a complete shift of control from the companies to the producing countries. 
The companies had unilaterally 'posted' a price for the crude they were producing. The role 
of the posted price was primarily to calculate the taxes due to the host governments, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKETS AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS | 3 
 
avoiding the controversies that would have arisen had 'market prices' been used instead. 
There was, in fact, no transparent and easily observed international oil market at the time.  
In 1973, the power of fixing posted prices shifted from the companies to the exporting 
countries. This opened the door to a period of intense instability in prices which went from 
1973 to 1985. Prices grew rapidly until 1980 and collapsed thereafter. 
 
Prices increased in the 1970s because of political events: the Yom Kippur war of 1973, the 
Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 and the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980. Prices were 
pushed to historical highs and OPEC simply sanctioned the level that was generated by 
short-term panic buying and supply disruptions. Notwithstanding the opposition of some of 
its members, notably Saudi Arabia, a longer-term vision of OPEC’s interests did not prevail: 
no consideration was given to the danger of demand destruction and growing non-OPEC 
supplies – although it was quite clear at that time that significant volumes of oil would be 
made available to the market from new producing regions, notably the North Sea, Alaska 
and Mexico. 
OPEC attempted to defend its posted price by cutting back on production and enforcing 
quotas on its members. Non-compliance eroded OPEC’s solidarity, already badly challenged 
by multiple conflicts between its Middle Eastern members. 
In 1985, Saudi Arabia abandoned the posted price system and resorted to netback pricing. 
The netback price regime was short lived, lasting only about two years. It led to a collapse in 
crude oil prices, partly because OPEC quota discipline broke down and production 
increased, and partly because netback pricing tends to guarantee the refiners’ margin and 
encourages refineries to run at full capacity, flooding the market with products and 
eventually reducing the netback value of the barrel. 
Chart of crude oil process since 1981
Crude oil prices 1861 - 2008
US dollar per barrel
World events4 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
Thus began the era of reference pricing, which is the prevailing regime to this day. Reference 
pricing means that the price of crude oil that is not freely traded is indexed to the price of 
crude oil that is freely traded, plus or minus an adjustment factor, which is periodically 
reviewed by the producing country depending on market conditions. In this system, the 
producing country can manipulate the adjustment factor, but by far the biggest influence on 
the price of any non-traded crude comes from variations in the price of the benchmark crude 
to which it is tied. 
Two markets have emerged as benchmark for all other crude oils - namely Brent in the UK 
and WTI (for West Texas Intermediate) in the US. This regime has proved more resilient in 
the face of political disturbances, but volatility has increased consistently and has exploded 
since 2007. The reason for increased volatility has been the progressive shift from referencing 
physical oil prices to referencing futures. 
According to Robert Mabro: 
Initially the marker prices were spot WTI, dated Brent, or spot ANS. The logic is that 
a marker price must be generated in a physical market where the transactions are 
sales and purchases of barrels of oil. Thus ‘market-related’ meant a relationship to 
prices arising at the margin of the physical market. This conforms to a fundamental 
economics principle that prices are determined at the margin.1  
However, physical oil transactions became increasingly unreliable because of dwindling 
physical volumes and the ease with which the market could be influenced. As futures 
trading developed – originally as an appendix of the physical market intended to provide 
liquidity, but subsequently to attract trading many times in excess of that of the physical 
market – the balance of price discovery shifted from physical oil to futures. 
We are now in the midst of a major controversy concerning whether 'speculation' is 
excessive, or 'investors' are simply providers of badly needed liquidity and better equipped 
to judge longer-term trends. Do oil prices nowadays respond to fundamentals or to 
speculation? 
According to some, prices respond to fundamentals and indeed 'investors' or 'speculators' 
are better judges of long-term trends than 'commercial' traders, i.e. the oil companies. 
Throughout the 1990s and well into the early years of this century, major international oil 
companies maintained that the price of oil at $18 per barrel (on average in the 1990s) was too 
high and would prove untenable. This opinion, it should be added, shaped the major 
companies’ investment policies, leading to very conservative investment decisions and a 
preference for mergers and acquisitions over the development of new projects. 
Against this view, a current of opinion insisted that oil is finite and production will 
inevitably peak. Various versions of the peak oil theory have been proposed at different 
times and heated controversy has characterised this debate. 
The futures market were already signalling a tendency to increase in 2002 and early 2003. 
Prices had, in fact, increased in 2000, but this spike had been deemed untenable by a majority 
of experts. And in early 2003, the expectation was that prices would fall again, following the 
US and allies’ intervention for regime change in Iraq, which would lead to an increase in 
Iraqi production and exertpressure on OPEC. 
                                                      
1 Robert Mabro, “The International Oil Price Regime - Origins, Rationale and Assessment”, Journal of 
Energy Literature, Vol. XI, No. 1, June 2005, pp 3-20. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKETS AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS | 5 
 
Instead, 2004 saw an unexpected increase in demand and further price increases. The futures 
market signalled a tendency towards higher prices through a persistent contango which, at 
the time, was deemed unjustified. The market was indicating its fundamental belief that oil 
would become relatively scarce as demand increased faster than supply. This is not 
necessarily the same as expecting a peak: all that is required is an expectation that supply 
will grow more slowly than demand. Today, most experts would agree that the market was 
right and preachers of low oil prices had been wrong. 
However, in 2007 and even more so in 2008, the market was shaken by such violent swings 
that it is impossible to find a rational justification for the shifts in fundamentals. There was 
no dramatic demand increase or supply restriction to justify the doubling of prices between 
the beginning of 2008 and July of the same year, nor the dramatic collapse later in the year. 
Such swings can only be understood as part of the turbulence that hit financial markets, of 
which today’s futures oil market is part and parcel. The price of oil is therefore highly 
exposed to financial markets vagaries' and disequilibria, and it has ceased to send a useful 
signal to corporate decision makers that can guide them in sanctioning long-term 
investment.  
From the point of view of security of supply, what is the point of worrying about disruptions 
if their only impact is a major swing in oil prices, which could also happen if there is no 
major physical disruption?  
Obviously, it is necessary to address the issue of price stability, and especially that of prices 
converging towards a long-term value, which may credibly be used for investment decisions. 
2.  Structural causes of oil price instability 
Oil prices, like the prices of most commodities, are unstable because of well-understood 
structural causes. 
Firstly, investment is the key cost component, while direct costs are relatively less important. 
This means that once the investment is made and the capacity created, it will be utilised even 
if prices fall well below the break-even point. It is only if prices fall below direct costs that 
the producer will consider shutting capacity, and even then it may be costly (in terms of 
immediate costs or forfeited long-term revenue) to shut capacity. 
Secondly, investment gestation times are very long. For a while, the industry boasted that it 
was able to go from discovery to production in a much shorter time than in the past, but a 
few exceptional offshore examples in the Gulf of Guinea have since been overshadowed by 
numerous disaster stories – from the Gulf of Mexico to Sakhalin and Kashagan.2 Whether it 
is field development, pipeline construction or refinery construction, this is an industry in 
which five to ten years easily pass from the moment the investment is sanctioned to the 
moment it becomes operational. For all practical purposes, this means that investment is 
made with little or no knowledge of the returns it will bring when it becomes operational. 
True, the futures market can mitigate this risk and offers contracts and derivatives several 
years into the future, but liquidity at such distant maturities is thin and the feasibility of 
massive hedging of investment is problematic. In fact, very few major projects are financed 
with risk mitigation from the futures market. 
                                                      
2 The Kashagan oil field in the Caspian Sea offshore Kazakhstan was discovered in 2000. The cost of its 
development has ballooned and the time of first production has repeatedly been postponed. At the 
time of writing, the field is not yet in operation. 6 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
Thirdly, and most importantly, both demand and supply are rigid in the short term. In 
econometric studies, short-term price elasticity has consistently been found to be very low, in 
fact very close to zero3. Long-term elasticity is more significant, being estimated in a range of 
0.5-0.6 for the OECD countries and much lower for the developing countries. Finally, authors 
who have repeated this estimate over time have found that price elasticity is declining – a 
consequence of the fact that other fuels have largely been substituted for oil uses in which 
substitution was easy. 
The income elasticity of oil demand is higher than the price elasticity, meaning that oil 
demand can effectively be curbed only by reducing disposable income, i.e. through a 
recession.  
The price elasticity of non-OPEC oil supply is also low, reflecting the points made above 
about investment being the main cost component and requiring long gestation. OPEC supply 
is of course considered a political variable and it is expanded or contracted depending on the 
organisation’s price target and perception of market conditions – no structural elasticity can 
be measured. 
The combination of rigid demand and rigid supply means that price signals generated by the 
market are not very effective in balancing the market. Or, conversely, it means that even very 
small shifts in the balance between demand and supply will provoke large changes in prices. 
In essence, this market can truly be balanced only through income and investment 
adjustments, which are slow and generally considered unwelcome. After all, the purpose of 
energy security is to maintain income and consumption levels, and concluding that demand 
and supply can only be balanced through declining income levels defeats the purpose. 
Any discussion of the functioning of the international oil market with the aim of fostering 
security must therefore acknowledge that, in the short term, demand and supply are unlikely 
to be exactly in balance, and that this will cause wide swings in prices. The challenge is to 
aim at achieving a better balance of demand and supply in the longer term, so that short-
term price swings may be understood as oscillations around a central value, which is the 
long-term equilibrium price. 
The search for a long-term equilibrium price is further complicated by our poor 
understanding of the dynamics of both demand and supply. In the case of supply, the most 
frequent procedure is attempting to estimate the non-OPEC component of the total and 
calculating the required OPEC contribution as the difference between projected global 
demand and projected non-OPEC supplies. However, estimates of non-OPEC supplies turn 
out to be significantly off the mark even when looking as little as one year ahead (or less). 
This is all the more surprising because when looking at the near future, we know very well 
which fields are in production and how they behave, and precious few surprises would seem 
to be possible. Instead, estimates of non-OPEC supplies are almost invariably off the mark 
and for the past few years they have been systematically in excess of recorded production. 
The lack of success in predicting demand is in a sense even more surprising – because here 
we deal with literally billions of decision-makers, whose aggregate behaviour should be 
statistically predictable. In contrast, demand forecasts for any year are constantly adjusted 
(and by significant margins) as the year progresses, and in the end the distance from the 
                                                      
3 See, for example, Christopher Allsopp and Bassam Fattouh, “Oil Prices: Fundamentals or 
Speculation?”, presentation to the Bank of England, 13 June 2008, slides 10, 11 and 13.  THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKETS AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS | 7 
 
original expectation to the recorded result can easily be of the order of 1 to 2%. With 0.05 
price elasticity of demand, this alone justifies a 20% swing in prices… 
Thus at any point in time we really have very little confidence about future demand and 
supply, and such lack of confidence fundamentally contributes to the perception of 
insecurity about energy supply.  
3.  Structural changes in the supply of liquid fuels 
In the search for a longer-term equilibrium price for investment, we may have our task 
facilitated by some important changes which are occurring in the international oil industry. 
Conventional crude oil is no longer the sole source of liquid fuels. Non-conventional sources 
will become increasingly important and the common feature of these sources is that they are 
primarily industrial processes in which output is much more easily predictable as a function 
of investment. The timing and production profile over time also are much more easily 
predictable. 
Conventional oil is the realm of uncertainty. Exploration may or may not be successful, and a 
discovery may be a giant or a small field. The resources in place are never exactly known and 
estimates of reserves are constantly updated, generally upwards, but sometimes 
downwards. The time required for developing a field and the development cost per barrel of 
added capacity vary widely across the spectrum and are not always exactly predictable 
(Kashagan will serve as reminder for a long time). Finally, production from a field generally 
reaches a plateau rather quickly, but it is not easy to know for how long the plateau will last 
and how rapid might the decline be thereafter. 
In contrast, most unconventional projects are much more predictable. The availability of the 
resource is not in question, be it oil sands, Orinoco bitumen or oil shale; in fact the available 
resource is so much greater than what is used as to be practically infinite. The difficulty is in 
the cost of the investment, with relatively minor operational issues involved – even the 
technology is not very demanding. At the time the investment is sanctioned, the investor 
knows with considerable precision what output he will get from the project and this output 
will be sustained for the life of the equipment. In this sense, non-conventional oil projects are 
much closer to a factory than to a mining operation, although they are a combination of the 
two. The limiting factor is the transformation capacity, not the availability of the raw 
material. 
This is all the more true for projects transforming gas to liquids or coal to liquids. These are 
essentially petrochemical ventures.  
The incremental capacity obtained through investment in non-conventional oil projects is 
relatively small compared with the investment and the global supply of crude oil. There is 
little danger that a sudden rush of non-conventional projects will cause an unexpected 
increase in supply and a collapse in prices which may undermine investment. Output 
increases from non-conventional projects will be gradual and very predictable. 
As for conventional oil, predictability may also increase because the frequency of very large 
discoveries has dwindled to almost zero, while the number of declining regions is increasing. 
The probability of a sudden increase in capacity is therefore very low.  
As declining fields come to account for a growing share of total oil reserves, the importance 
of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) increases. The effects of implementing EOR on declining 
fields cannot exactly be predicted, but the connection between investment and increased 
capacity is much tighter than with conventional methods. Also, as EOR methods are more 8 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
widely adopted, the ratio of direct costs to investment costs may increase (this depends on 
the specific EOR technology adopted) and investment and production may become more 
responsive to prices. 
From the demand side, it is not clear whether the development of alternatives to the use of 
fossil liquid fuels will increase or decrease price elasticity. As mentioned earlier, the evidence 
appears to be that the concentration of oil in those uses for which it is most difficult to find a 
substitute has further decreased elasticity. However, the appearance of alternatives in the 
transportation sector may generate greater responsiveness in demand if the consumer has –
directly or indirectly – the possibility of switching from one fuel or source of energy (or 
mode of transportation) to a different one.  
4.  Containing price volatility 
In the light of extreme price fluctuations since 2007, the attention of politicians and experts 
has been drawn to the need to dampen short-term fluctuations and achieve greater reliability 
of prices. 
The pendulum has swung back from the extreme position that favoured exclusive reliance 
on unregulated markets, to a position advocating the reining in of speculators and pursuit of 
a 'fair for all' price.4 
The experience of the oil price yo-yo of 2007-09 has been sufficiently traumatic to lead to the 
emergence of a degree of political consensus on the need to dampen volatility and agree on a 
price that is acceptable to all sides. Expressions of concern have been voiced not only by the 
major OPEC exporters, but also by leaders of the major industrialised countries, notably the 
UK prime minister, Gordon Brown, President Sarkozy5 and President Obama. It has been 
said that a consensus may be emerging to the extent that a 'fair' price might be in the region 
of $65-80 per barrel.  
Given these developments, the proposal has been made to establish an international 
committee that would decide on prices6 or a price band,7 as already happens with (national 
decisions on) interest rates. But how would such a consensus be implemented and enforced? 
How could producers and major consumers agree on sharing the burden of implementation 
(which presumably would require active market intervention)? 
 
                                                      
4 The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies held a conference on oil price volatility in October 2009 at St. 
Catherine’s College. A summary of the discussion, which was held under Chatham House rules, was 
published in the Oxford Energy Forum No. 79 of November 2009. 
5 Gordon Brown and Nicholas Sarkozy (2009), “Oil Prices Need Government Supervision”, Wall Street 
Journal, 8 July. 
6 Robert Mabro has proposed the creation of an independent commission backed by significant 
research capability and an international convention that would be expected to set a reference price for 
oil once a month. ENI, the energy company, has proposed the creation of a global energy agency 
“which might possess the tools to implement concrete initiatives as needed to stabilise the price of oil” 
(my translation of Scaroni’s original speech, available in Italian from http://www.eni.com/en_IT/ 
attachments/media/speeches-interviews/italian-version-speech-scaroni-G8-energia-25-maggio-
2009.pdf). 
7 See in particular, Bassam Fattouh and Christopher Allsopp (2009), “The Price Band and Oil Price 
Dynamics”, Oxford Energy Comment, July. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKETS AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS | 9 
 
Finally, it has been proposed that the major oil-producing countries – notably Saudi Arabia – 
should take a more active role in the price discovery process and engage in direct sales of 
their crude oil through auctions of forward contracts for physical delivery and acceptance of 
a secondary market.8 
5.  Relying on longer-term pricing 
Even if speculation is curbed and short-term volatility is successfully dampened, it would be 
advisable to rely on price signals from longer-term maturities rather than on spot or front- 
month prices. Prices for longer maturities (3, 6 or 12 months) always fluctuate less than front-
month prices and are inherently more stable because they are not influenced by short-term 
inconsistencies of demand and supply. 
There is no overwhelming reason why prices to the final consumer should reflect the spot or 
front-month market. Refiners and retailers have the option of hedging forward and could 
very well be asked to guarantee a price to their customers or give significant advance notice 
of any variation. The market will not spontaneously generate such behaviour: no oil 
products retailer has considered competing by guaranteeing a price to its customers for a 
given period of time. The reason is simple: customers cannot be tied to a specific supplier. 
They would prefer the supplier that guarantees a price in the longer run for as long as that 
price is lower than the competition, and then switch to the competition as soon as it goes up. 
However, if regulations were adopted that required all suppliers to guarantee prices for a 
given period of time and/or to announce changes with sufficient advance notice, the final 
consumer could not take advantage of prices that may be lower in the short term. 
It is normally considered that the markets for oil products are either free or controlled, and 
the latter frequently means that prices that are kept artificially low because governments are 
reluctant to pass price increases for crude oil on to the final consumers. Indeed, the extensive 
reliance on price controls in developing countries, notably in the fast-growing Asian 
countries, has been singled out as one reason for the rigidity of demand relative to prices: 
demand is simply shielded from higher prices.  
What is proposed here is not a system of price controls, but a set of regulations which would 
in essence encourage refiners and retailers to hedge on the futures market and lock in prices 
which they offer to their clients. Requesting retailers to 'post' prices which can only be 
changed with, say, three months’ advance notice would probably yield the best results: 
competitors would be able to decide whether to follow the moves of the price leader and 
price competition would still be possible. If prices need to be guaranteed over a set period of 
time, adjustments will be more difficult and competition will be discouraged. In all cases, 
coordination leading to price fixing needs to be repressed. 
The combination of advance notice and limits to the frequency of price changes would 
represent an increase of energy security for the final consumer per se. In theory, the final 
consumer could use the futures market and derivatives to reduce his risk and enhance his 
own security even in today’s conditions, but in practice this is beyond the means of most 
consumers. Only large consumers, such as airlines or shipping companies, have done so, and 
they too are vulnerable to the threat of consumer disloyalty whenever their final prices are 
                                                      
8 Giacomo Luciani (2011),  “From Price Taker to Price Maker? Saudi Arabia and the World Oil 
Market”, Rahmania Occasional Paper No. 03. 10 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
higher than the competition. Regulations for encouraging systematic hedging would 
contribute to energy security overall. 
6.  Price bands 
The concept of a price band has been around for some time as a way to dampen volatility 
through a maximum and minimum price target, which would trigger action on the part of 
producers and/or consumers as the market price approaches or crosses the extremes of the 
band. OPEC had a notional price band between 2000 and 2005. Robert Mabro, Christopher 
Allsopp and Bassam Fattouh of the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies have all argued in 
favour of a band. Behrooz Baik Alizadeh of the Iranian Ministry of Petroleum has written: 
In its 109th ordinary meeting in March 2000, OPEC unofficially introduced its price 
band mechanism to the market. Within this mechanism, in the case of the average 
OPEC Basket crude price falling under $22/b [per barrel] for more than 10 successive 
working days, OPEC member states would be obligated to cut their daily production 
by 500,000 b/d [barrels per day], and in the case of the price exceeding $28/B for 20 
successive working days, OPEC would increase production by 500,000 b/d. 
Although OPEC took advantage of this mechanism only once, increasing production 
by 500,000 b/d beginning on 31 October 2000, and gave up the whole idea in January 
2005, introduction of this mechanism affected the market psychologically and 
stabilised prices during the period that OPEC was not inclined to change prices 
beyond specific limits.9 
The problem with any price band concept is the instrumentation of intervention required 
whenever the price approaches the limits. In the absence of appropriate instrumentation, it is 
not at all clear that the market psychology will be affected – indeed the market may be 
tempted to challenge the band and test the will of governments trying to enforce it. 
A price band may be effective if both importing and exporting countries agree on its limits. It 
is not clear that such an agreement would ever be possible, although at present it appears 
that the target prices of both sides are very close. The interests of exporters and importers are 
in structural opposition, and convergence is likely to be an exception. However, it cannot be 
excluded that the industrial countries’ concern for climate change and their desire to 
diversify their energy lead to a shift away from fossil fuels and oil in particular. Moreover, 
the exporting countries’ fear that oil might be penalised as a consequence has indeed created 
a new order of priorities on both sides, so that the importers no longer wish to minimise, and 
the exporters no longer wish to maximise, the price. 
Secondly, for the band to be a useful concept it would be necessary to enforce supply 
restraint on all exporters, not just OPEC. It may be argued that the threat of unrestrained 
expansion of non-OPEC supplies is fading away, because non-OPEC countries are unable to 
expand their production very much and, in fact, non-OPEC production has already peaked 
or reached a plateau according to some interpretations. Nevertheless, the importing 
countries should be ready to defend the lower limit of the band by imposing limitations on 
imports of oil from non-OPEC countries, if necessary. 
In the opposite case of prices reaching the upper limit of the band, OPEC countries would 
obviously be called to use all of their available capacity to supply a tight market. However, if 
OPEC reached the limit of its capacity and the market remained tight, then the importing 
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countries should be ready to ration domestic consumption, or use 'strategic' stocks (more on 
stocks later). In theory, this would also require concerted action on the part of all importers – 
something that is guaranteed to be very contentious and difficult to achieve. In the absence 
of concerted action, free riding on the part of some would prevail.  
A further difficulty has to do with revisions or adjustments to the band. If the band is 
adjusted very frequently – à la limite, in response to any price movement - it ends up being 
no restraint at all on volatility. At the same time, a band that is never adjusted is bound to 
become obsolete and untenable. Finding the optimal middle-of-the-road solution is highly 
subjective and controversial. If we add that this middle-of-the-road compromise would need 
to be collectively endorsed by both oil exporters and importers, we conclude that the task is 
very difficult indeed. 
A price band might be useful if it is intended to limit price volatility only within a specified 
period of time, and involves a market-responsive automatic adjustment mechanism. For 
example, it may be envisaged that the price band would extend x% above and below a 
central price equal to the average of observed prices in the previous year. In this way, if the 
price remains consistently close to the upper or lower limit of the band, the central price for 
the following year will be adjusted and the band moved up or down. The frequency of 
adjustment of the central price should be inversely proportional to the scope of the band. A 
system of very frequent adjustments (e.g. weekly adjustments of the central price to a 
moving average of the observed price over the previous x months) might be compatible with 
a relatively narrow band (say 10% above or below the central price). This would serve the 
purpose of dampening very short-term volatility. 
However, if the objective is to create a more reliable investment environment, priority should 
be given to less-frequent adjustments and a wider band. The beneficial effect on investment 
decisions of a broadly based agreement on a central price is likely to outweigh the 
uncertainty intrinsic in a relatively broader band. 
Finally, as mentioned, the effectiveness of a band depends on its instrumentation. Supply 
restraint may take the form of output limits or the accumulation of stocks, which in turn 
could be used to counter excessive price increases. This leads us to the possibility of using 
intervention stocks in addition to strategic stocks, or some hybrid formula of 
strategic/intervention stocks. 
7.  Managing stocks 
Strategic stocks are discussed in a separate paper within the SECURE project. The discussion 
shows the ambiguity of strategic stocks and the rules concerning their use, especially with 
respect to containing price variations. 
In theory, strategic stocks are clearly distinct from commercial or intervention stocks. 
Strategic stocks are meant to be used in case of supply emergencies and to serve the purpose 
of guaranteeing energy security. Intervention stocks are meant to maintain prices at a fixed 
level or within a band. In practice, the distinction is blurred because the concept of energy 
security incorporates the notion of affordability and, therefore, some notion of a maximum 
acceptable price. Furthermore, emergencies or disturbances arising from geopolitical events 
such as wars or revolutions tend to be reflected in price levels more than in physically 
available supplies: in the end, demand always is matched by supply. Consequently, strategic 
stocks whose utilisation is based on a strict quantitative criterion (as is the case for the 
International Energy Agency's emergency response mechanism) tend never to be used.  12 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
Intervention stocks are normally not very well regarded because in all cases in which the 
defence of a rigid price through the use of an intervention stock has been attempted, the 
stock facility eventually went bust. A rigid price regime invites speculation and eventually 
market forces overwhelm any stock that may have been be accumulated.  
At the same time, it stands to reason that stocks should be accumulated at times when the 
price is declining or low, and liquidated at times when prices are high or increasing. 
Accumulating stocks even at times when prices are increasing appears intuitively irrational. 
What this means is that institutions and facilities should be established to manage stocks in a 
flexible way and in the absence of a fixed price regime. If a band is broadly agreed, as 
discussed in the previous section, then institutions managing stocks will feel encouraged to 
sell when the price approaches the top of the band and buy when it approaches the bottom, 
but it might be dangerous to impose a rigid rule on the stock managers. 
Should governments establish intervention stocks? In theory, managing stocks in a way 
which serves to maintain prices within a band is a profitable operation and might very well 
be undertaken by private investors. Investors may choose to buy and sell purely paper 
b a r r e l s  o r  t h e y  m a y  d e c i d e  t o  h o l d  p h y s i c a l  barrels: the latter option is likely to have a 
beneficial effect on price stability. The objective of government regulations should therefore 
be to encourage private investors to hold physical stocks. Today, individual investors (the 
doctors and dentists of Chicago fame) and large financial investors shy away from physical 
barrels, and want to deal only in paper. 
Encouraging the holding of physical stocks requires passing legislation that will make it 
easier to build and maintain storage. This is partly an issue of environmental and fiscal rules, 
partly an issue of market organisation. Physical storage operators (who shall be separate 
legal entities from the owners of the stored oil) should be empowered to issue certificates 
convertible into physical barrels: oil deposited into the storage would be exchanged for such 
certificates and certificates could be used to withdraw oil from storage. There is nothing 
exotic about this, but such a facility, and a market for the certificates that it might issue, does 
not exist.  
Governments may well decide to facilitate this development by establishing an agency to 
build and manage the storage facility10 – this can be established at the national or regional 
level or both – and issue certificates to oil depositors. The possibility of depositing oil would 
be open to all, including national oil companies of oil-exporting countries. Storage facilities 
could be established in all appropriate locations, not necessarily in the territory of the 
country or group of countries establishing them. In fact, it might be very interesting to 
establish large storage facilities at critical logistical junctures, such as the Suez Canal or the 
Malacca Strait, or in conjunction with pipeline projects which bypass these. 
Major trading companies maintain storage facilities already today, but the phenomenon is 
limited11 and not sufficient to influence crude-oil prices. Much larger storage facilities are 
                                                      
10 Japan, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia have an agreement along these lines. Japan has built storage in 
Japan itself that is offered to Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia free of charge to store its oil. The stored oil 
belongs to the producer but obviously Japan gains a degree of security because of this. See “Saudi 
Arabia to store oil in Japan”, Reuters, 23 December 2009. 
11 In May 2010 Vitol sold 50% of its global storage business to Malaysia’s MISC, a subsidiary of 
Petronas, the purpose being to attract additional equity to expand the business. Vitol being a privately 
held company owned by its employees, it faces difficulty in tapping the equity market and finance 
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needed, and the private sector may not be attracted to build them. Nevertheless, per se the 
business of operating storage facilities may very well be profitable if investment in physical 
stocks develops as envisaged here.  
Stored-oil certificates should be designed and regulated in such a way that they will be 
accepted as collateral by financial institutions. This would open the possibility for oil 
exporting countries to 'deposit' oil that they cannot sell at prices that they deem convenient, 
a n d  t o  b o r r o w  f u n d s  t o  m a k e  u p  f o r  t h e  t e m p orary shortfall in revenue. Of course, if 
assumptions about future prices are unrealistic, they may end up defaulting – but this 
should be a concern of the banks, as is the case for any credit issued against real collateral. 
8.  Demand security 
In discussions of energy security, the producing countries have frequently stated that they 
are willing to engage in the investment that is required to meet expected future demand, but 
they need some demand security, i.e. assurance that the demand will be there as expected. In 
other words, security of supply begs security of demand. 
In a free-market environment, there can of course be no assurance of future demand. 
Importing countries are at a loss to respond to the request for demand security because they 
possess no tools to guarantee demand. How can this problem be approached? 
The establishment of storage facilities where oil could be deposited against certificates that 
may be discounted by financial intermediaries is of course already a step in the right 
direction. An agreement to consult and coordinate in the accumulation/disposal of strategic 
stocks may also be of help. But neither is likely to be viewed as providing sufficient security 
of demand. 
The gas industry historically solved the problem through take-or-pay contracts. These were 
said to place the burden of the volume risk on the buyer and leave the burden of the price 
risk on the seller. There is no denying that this arrangement, unpopular as it might have 
become, has allowed the implementation of some very ambitious investment projects and 
significant improvement in Europe’s energy supplies. But these arrangements were only 
possible because prices were exogenously generated: gas prices were indexed to oil and oil 
products' prices in order to guarantee the competitiveness of gas in marginal uses.  
In the case of oil, we cannot think in terms of take-or-pay contracts because the price needs to 
be internally generated. However, individual countries, including large ones, could 
conceivably conclude take-or-pay contracts and index the price to signals generated 
elsewhere in the world. For example, China or India could put in place take-or-pay contracts 
for volumes of Gulf oil, and index the price to Brent or WTI or some other traded market 
(e.g. the DME Oman contract). This would provide the Gulf producers with significant 
demand certainty and probably would be viewed with considerable anxiety by importers in 
the US, Japan and Europe. We are not quite there yet, it should be said, although the 
intensification of relations between the Gulf and the emerging countries in Asia does point in 
this direction. 
The drawback of this arrangement is that it would divide the oil market into two segments – 
one price making and the other price taking.  It is to be expected that the smaller the price-
making segment is in relation to the price-taking one, the higher the volatility on the price 
making segment would be. This is the same as saying that oil may be sold on the basis of 
long-term evergreen contracts or on a short-term basis: price is generated on the short-term 
market and this is where all potential demand/supply imbalances will be felt. Such 14 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
imbalances may be minor when related to global demand and supply, but large when 
related to short-term trading only.  
Today, we have a system that is very close to this: prices are indexed to traded markets that 
are a very small component of global physical supply and demand. The difference is that 
there are no proper take-or-pay contracts, only evergreen contracts which envisage neither 
an obligation to supply on the part of the seller nor an obligation to lift on the part of the 
buyer. In addition, the price directly reflects all the volatility of short-term markets. But an 
evolution towards take-or-pay contracts closer to those familiar to the gas industry is 
conceivable. 
9.  Vertical integration 
Another potential way of encouraging longer-term investment in the industry is that of 
facilitating vertical integration. In the current downturn, the large, vertically integrated 
international oil companies have claimed that their investment plans are unaffected by the 
downturn and based on their long-term strategy.  
This may or may not be true, of course. In past years, these same companies have frequently 
been criticised for allocating larger funds to purchasing their own stock and propping up the 
value of their shares than to industrial projects proper. They have also engaged extensively 
in mergers and acquisitions, a trend leading to the disappearance of several independent 
corporations – a loss of diversity which can only negatively affect the vitality of the sector. 
At the same time, it is true that large integrated companies 'own' their market thanks to their 
retail operations and the oligopolistic nature of the business, They therefore enjoy a 
considerable degree of demand security, although they face the price risk and are exposed to 
price volatility as any other player in the industry. Large integrated companies also have a 
broader capital base and may be better able to continue funding investment projects out of 
internally generated resources than smaller independents.  
Nevertheless, the 'old' large integrated companies remain vulnerable to the pressure from 
financial analysts and investors, who are typically interested only in 'returning value' to the 
shareholders in the short run. The functioning of financial markets does not encourage 
strategic thinking, as investors can enter and exit a stock at any time and are interested 
mostly in short-term appreciation. This is a problem for all industrial corporations, but it is 
an especially difficult problem for the oil companies, whose outlook is structurally long-
term.  
It is typical of the distorting signals that management receives from the financial market that 
all attention in recent years has been focused on cutting costs rather than guaranteeing the 
long-term growth of the company.  
Thus let it be noted that security of energy supply is also dependent on the functioning of 
financial markets and the kind of signals that emanate from them.  This is, however, not the 
place to enter into a discussion of how financial markets might be reformed to encourage 
longer-term thinking on the part of management. 
In any case, the problem that affects the behaviour of the 'old' large integrated companies 
does not affect the 'new' integrated companies: these are the national companies of the major 
importers, which are venturing internationally in order to improve their security of supply, 
as well as the national oil companies of the exporting countries, which are investing 
downstream in order to gain better control of their markets. In both cases, ownership 
remains either entirely or to a large extent in the hands of strategic investors, frequently the 
State itself, and strategic thinking is encouraged rather than short-term profitability.  THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKETS AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS | 15 
 
The growing role of these companies is a factor increasing energy security, because they will 
invest with a long-term perspective. The activism (or shall we say 'aggressive' approach) of 
Chinese companies to acquiring reserves internationally has frequently been portrayed as 
being a threat to importers in the OECD – while it should be more properly understood as an 
example to follow. Equally, the drive of some national oil companies to integrate 
downstream, acquiring refining and retailing assets in the importing countries, has 
frequently been viewed as a threat, as if it entailed a further degree of dependence and loss 
of control, while in fact it should be viewed as improving security of supply, reinforcing the 
commitment of the supplier to service its own assets and keeping the market supplied. 
Hence, vertical integration is important and it is good for energy security. The OECD 
countries should look into ways in which they may encourage more strategic behaviour on 
the part of the 'old' integrated majors, and preserve the sector by limiting the cannibalism 
represented by mergers and acquisitions. And they should welcome the downstream 
integration of the national oil companies of major producers, interpreting the will to invest as 
a commitment to supply. 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the functioning of markets is a key determinant of energy 
security. Geopolitical and other threats to physical supply may cause price shocks but, given 
historical experience, they are unlikely to cause any significant physical shortage. Therefore, 
insecurity is manifested by price shocks and price shocks are insecurity. But price shocks 
may very well originate in the absence of major disturbances to physical supplies, simply as 
runs originated by investors, or 'speculators', which the market does not correct because both 
demand and supply are rigid relative to prices. 
Price volatility is therefore a threat per se, in many ways more important and more 
devastating than potential threats to physical supplies. The cost of price volatility is very 
high, much higher than the potential cost of possible disruption to physical supply; and it is 
significant not just now, but even more so in the long term, because of the depressive effect it 
has on energy investment generally. 
Thus addressing price volatility is a key component of energy security policy.  
Unfortunately, there is no easy recipe to dampen price volatility.  This paper has reviewed 
several approaches that may reduce volatility, namely: 
•  Encouraging the freer trading of major crude-oil streams, notably those from the Gulf 
•  Increasing reliance on long-term pricing 
•  Enforcing an internationally agreed price band 
•  Managing stocks 
•  Offering demand security through take-or-pay contracts 
•  Encouraging vertical integration 
None of these approaches is sufficient to stabilise prices on its own, but collectively they may 
very well succeed in reducing the extreme volatility that has been experienced since 2004. 
Volatility will never be eliminated, because it is a structural feature of the oil industry, but it 
may be contained, and energy supply would be perceived as being much more secure.  16 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
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